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China’s Assertive Foreign Policy in South China Sea 
under Xi Jinping: Its Impact on United States and 
Australian Foreign Policy 
 
Lidya C. Sinaga*  Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), Indonesia 
 
Abstract 
This essay examines the impact of the assertiveness of China’s foreign policy in the South 
China Sea under Xi Jinping on United States (US) and Australian foreign policy. The essay 
focuses on the Xi Jinping period from 2013 because Xi has a different approach in foreign 
policy making from that of his predecessors. His determination to defend and advance 
maritime claims and interests as well as the external developments, have made his foreign 
policy more assertive. This essay will argue that China’s assertive foreign policy in the 
South China Sea under Xi Jinping has paved the way for a greater role for the US in 
Southeast Asia, and deepened the rivalry between China and the US. This rising tension in 
turn has put Australia in a challenging situation, torn between its security alliance with the 
US, and its economic interests in China. However, Australia does not have to choose one, 
but Australia can play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between 
the two. 
Key words: South China Sea, foreign policy, China, United States, Australia 
 
Introduction 
The South China Sea (SCS) dispute 
is an unresolved territorial problem in the 
Asia Pacific region. The dispute has 
escalated in recent years, especially since 
2009 when Malaysia and Vietnam jointly 
submitted information to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 
regarding the outer limits of the continental  
 
 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm).1 One 
day later, Vietnam made a national 
submission regarding the outer limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the 
baselines of Vietnam. For China, these 
actions represented a violation of Article 5 
of the 2002 Declaration of Code of Conduct 
(DoC) regarding efforts to refrain from 
                                                          
* Author’s contact: lidya.bosua@gmail.com  
1 W Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation 
and Development in South Cina Sea A Chinese 
Perspective, Chandos Publishing, UK, 2013, p. 152. 
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doing activities that could escalate the 
conflict. The DoC is an agreement between 
China and the Association of South East 
Asia Nations (ASEAN), which paved the 
way for a seven year period of peace 
between the SCS claimants which include 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. The 
2002-2009 period after the signing of the 
DoC was a period of peace in the SCS, 
which was remarked by no significant 
incidents between conflicting parties during 
this period. However, after 2009, a few 
incidents (as discussed later) happened at 
sea, especially between China and Vietnam, 
and China and the Philippines, reigniting 
tensions. 
As a response to Vietnam and 
Malaysia submissions, China then 
responded by submitting a verbal note to 
the United Nations, and attaching its ‚U-
shaped Line‛.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 China also responded to Vietnam’s declaration over 
the Paracels and Spratlys in its National Law of Sea 
by establishing a new city, Sansha, in July 2012, a city 
that  would have jurisdiction over the Paracels, 
Spratlys, and Macclesfield Bank. Two months later, in 
November 2012, China issued a new version of its 
passport which contains a  map of China that includes 
the U-shaped Line. J Zhang, ‘China’s growing 
assertiveness in the South China Sea A Strategic 
Shift?’, National Security College, retrieved 20 May 
2015, <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-
brief-4.pdf>. 
Figure 1: China’s “U-shaped Line” in the 
South China Sea 
 
Source: 
http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/vie
tnam-defence/5545-no-dispute-Cinas-1948-
nine-dash-line-map-plus-article-15-unclos-
clear.html, accessed 12 May 2015. 
 
For China, sovereignty claims over 
the four island groups in the SCS, the Pratas 
Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield 
Bank and the Spratly Islands, derive from 
its historical rights as the first country that 
discovered, named, and continuously used 
these islands for more than two centuries.3 
Accordingly, for China, no other claimant 
states in the SCS  have sufficient  evidence 
to support claims of sovereignty over the 
islands.4 After China declared its ‚nine-
dashed line‛5 in 1953, there was neither 
                                                          
3 Ibid, p. 16. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The Chinese claim in the South China Sea is called 
the ‚nine-dashed line‛ because as can be seen in Map 
1, it has a nine-dashed line (green lines). Another 
source called it the ‚U-shaped line‛ because the lines 
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opposition from the international 
community nor diplomatic protest against 
China from neighboring countries. 
Therefore, in China’s view, the ‚nine-
dashed line‛ had been approved and 
recognized by the international 
community.6  
2012 was the first time  the map 
delineating China’s claims had been 
officially published  since 1948. As argued 
by Jian Zhang, this action has been 
perceived by many as an indication of 
China’s growing assertiveness in regard to 
the SCS dispute.7  Indeed, since Xi Jinping 
came to power in 2013, he put 
‚safeguarding the country’s sovereignty 
and security, and defending our territorial 
integrity‛8 as high priorities.  Subsequently, 
China’s foreign policy in the SCS has 
become more assertive. 
Furthermore, 2009 also marked the 
beginning of the involvement of external 
powers in the SCS dispute, especially the 
US. By signing the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC), US indicated its 
strategic ‘pivot’ towards the Asia Pacific. 
The US intended to play a greater role in the 
region, particularly in the SCS dispute, on 
behalf of its commitment to its allies in 
South East Asia, especially the Philippines. 
The US position raises questions regarding 
Australia’s position, another US security 
ally in the Asia Pacific.  
                                                                                       
created a U-shape, while others have called it the 
‚nine-dotted line‛. 
6 Li Jinming dan Li Dexia, ‚The Dotted Line on the 
Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note‛, Ocean 
Development and International Law No. 34, 2003. 
7 J Zhang, op.cit. 
8 Council on Foreign relations, ‘China’s Maritime 
Disputes’, retrieved 20 May 2015, 
<http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-
maritime-disputes/p31345/#!/> 
In light of these arguments, this 
essay argues that China’s assertive foreign 
policy in the SCS has had an impact on US 
and Australian foreign policy. The rise of 
China, to some extent, places Australia in a 
challenging situation, torn between its 
security alliance with the US and its 
economic interests in China, Australia’s 
largest trading partner. However, the 
growing rivalry between China and the US 
does not mean Australia must choose one. 
Meanwhile, Australia can play a 
constructive role in the development of 
some compromise between the two. 
 
 
China’s Assertive Foreign Policy in the 
South China Sea Under Xi Jinping 
“While we pursue peaceful development, we will 
never relinquish our legitimate rights and 
interests, or allow China's core interests to be 
undermined. We should firmly uphold China's 
territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and 
interests and national unity, and properly 
handle territorial and island disputes.‛9 
Xi Jinping, November 2014 
 
Xi Jinping has led a transformation 
in China’s domestic and foreign policy. 
Since Xi Jinping was appointed as the 
party’s general secretary in the 18th 
Party Congress of November 2012, Xi 
has put himself at the centre of a new 
leadership, leaving behind the 
‚collective leadership‛ style upheld 
                                                          
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, ‘The Central Conference on Work Relating 
to Foreign Affairs’, Beijing, 29 November 2014, 
retrieved 9 May 2015, 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t121
5680.shtml>. 
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since Deng Xiaoping.10 He has put a 
hallmark on his new leadership by 
revealing ‚The Chinese Dream/Zhongguo 
Meng".11 A year later, after Xi came into 
power in 2013, he spoke at the Central 
Conference on Work Relating to Foreign 
Affairs, announcing a new development in 
China’s foreign policy. At this high level 
meeting of the China Communist Party on 
foreign relations, Xi officially laid out his 
new shift in foreign policy, marking a 
transformation from Deng Xiaoping’s 
dictum of ‚keeping a low profile‛ to ‚active 
and creative‛ strategy. For Xi Jinping, 
foreign policy should help realise the ‚Two 
100s‛12, which means ‚China becomes a 
"moderately well-off society" by 2020, the 
100th anniversary of the Communist Party 
of China; and that modernizing China 
becomes a fully developed nation in the 
year 2049, the celebration of 100 years of the 
People's Republic of China‛.13 According to 
Medcalf, Xi’s speech underlines ‚China's 
                                                          
10 ‘The Power of Xi Jinping’, The Economist, retrieved 
10 May 2015, 
<http://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-
cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-
what-will-he-do-his-political>. 
11 The "Chinese Dream" includes four important 
things, namely Strong China (economic, political, 
diplomatic, scientific, and military), Civilized China 
(equality and fairness, rich culture, high morals), 
Harmonious China (friendship between social 
classes), and Beautiful China (healthy environment 
and less pollution). 
12 T Shi & D Tweed, ‘Xi Jinping Outlines ‘Big Country 
Diplomacy for China’’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 
December 2014,  retrieved 19 May 2015, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/world/xi-jinping-outlines-
big-country-diplomacy-for-china-20141202-
11yaj5.html>.  
13 Kuhn R L, ‘Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream’, New York 
Times, 4 June 2013, retrieved 10 May 2015, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/
xi-jinpings-chinese-
dream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 
determination to defend and advance its 
maritime claims and interests‛14 and clearly 
sends a message that China will protect its 
core interests.15 However, this is not a new 
policy because protection of maritime rights 
and interests was addressed in China’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan in March 2011.16 
China’s core national interests have 
driven China’s foreign policy, with 
domestic political stability also related to 
foreign policy.17 These core national 
interests include sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and sustainable socio-economic 
development. The report of the 18th CCP 
Congress of 2012, a guide for the next five 
years, emphasized the importance of 
protecting these interests and sovereign 
rights of China, and of not surrendering to 
outside pressure. The 18th CCP Congress 
also reclassified the South China Sea as a 
‚core national interest‛.18 Xi Jinping also put 
nationalism, patriotism and pride, at the 
centre of his leadership.19 As argued by 
Huang, Xi Jinping realized that nationalism 
is a powerful notion in Chinese society.20 
China’s grand new strategy certainly 
attracted international attention, especially 
                                                          
14 R Medcalf, ‘Xi Jinping Speech: More Diplomacy, 
Less Raw Power’, 1 December 2014, retrieved 19 May 
2015,  
<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/01/Xi-
Jinping-speech-More-diplomacy-less-raw-
power.aspx?COLLCC=272644824&>. 
15 F Cameron, ‘China’s Foreign Policy under the New 
Leadership-More Continuity than Change’, retrieved 
10 May 2015, < http://www.eu-
asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=124>. 
16 J Zhang, op.cit. 
17 F Cameron, op.cit. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 C Huang, ‘Xi’s Chinese Dream’, in J Sharp, The 
China Renaissance The Rise of Xi Jinping and the 18th 
Communist Party Congress, World Scientific 
Publishing, Singapore, 2013, p. 37. 
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on the SCS territorial and island disputes, as 
illustrated by China’s 2009 sovereignty 
claim (the ‚nine-dashed line‛). There are 
several other indications of China’s growing 
assertiveness in the South China Sea under 
Xi Jinping.  
First, China actively conducts 
military exercises in the SCS in order to 
strengthen its claims. Also, China regularly 
sends patrol boats to the area, and has even 
built military posts and airstrips on some 
islands. In December 2013, China sent its 
first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, to the 
SCS. These moves heightened regional 
tensions, especially following China’s 
unilateral declaration of an Air Defense 
Identification Zone/ADIZ in the East China 
Sea. Some people worried that China would 
make a similar declaration regarding the 
SCS.21 
Second, the 2014 placement of the 
Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig at a location 
within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) triggered massive anti-Chinese 
protests in Hanoi.22 After nearly two 
months, on July 16, 2014, the China 
National Petroleum Corp finally shut down 
the rig and moved it closer to Hainan Island 
in southern China. 
                                                          
21 A Panda, ‘One Year of ADIZ: What Next for 
China?’, The Diplomat, 27 November 2014, retrieved 20 
May 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/one-year-
of-adiz-what-next-for-china/>. 
22 At least 1000 people took to the street protests 
against the Chinese actions. This unrest not only 
attacked the Chinese passport workers, but also 
destroyed and looted Chinese-owned companies and 
factories which were operating in Vietnam. More than 
3,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from some 
parts of Vietnam after riots since mid-May 2014. The 
Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately responded by 
evacuating its citizens and did not allow its citizens to 
travel to Vietnam. 
Third, China has carried out 
extensive land reclamation projects in the 
SCS. However, Article 121 of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) declares that submerged 
features (such as shoals) cannot be claimed 
by any party and that ‚rocks which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life 
of their own shall have no exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf‛23. China 
is now building new islands on five 
different reefs and is creating conditions to 
sustain human habitation to bolster its 
claims.24 In January 2014, a massive land 
reclamation was done at Johnson South 
Reef.25 Since 2014, additional land 
reclamation is also being done on Woody 
Island, Duncan Island, and Drummon 
Island, accompanied  by infrastructure.26 
According to Tiezzi, Johnson South Reef 
will be the home to a new South China Sea 
airbase.27 
Fourth, in June 2014, The Hunan 
Map Publishing House issued a Chinese 
map, which displayed a ten-dashed line of 
the South China Sea that incorporated 
                                                          
23 United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea’, retrieved 20 May 2015, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreement
s/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>. 
24 S Tiezzi, ‘Why Is China Building Islands in the 
South China Sea?’, The Diplomat, 10 September 2014, 
retrieved 20 May 2015, <a>. 
25 R Wingfield-Hayes, ‘China’s Island Factory’, 9 
September 2014, retrieved 20 May 2015, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_
8701/index.html>. 
26 V R Lee, ‘South China Sea: China Is Building on the 
Paracels As Well’, The Diplomat, 14 April 2015, 
retrieved 21 May 2015, 
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-china-sea-
china-is-building-on-the-paracels-as-well/>. 
27 S Tiezzi, op.cit. 
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Taiwan into mainland China.28 And fifth, in 
March 2014, China blocked two civilian 
ships chartered by the Philippines navy to 
send logistics to the Philippines Marine 
Unit stationed on Second Thomas Shoal. 
This disputed shoal in the Spratly Islands is 
located 200 km from Kalayaan Islands-
Western Philippines, and has been claimed 
as part of the Philippines’ continental shelf. 
There are several factors 
contributing to Xi Jinping’s more assertive 
policies in the South China Sea. First, recent 
external developments have driven China 
to adopt a more assertive position in the 
South China Sea. As argued by Zhang, these 
developments to be, in part, the result of  
Beijing’s previously more moderate 
position, one that  failed to effectively 
protect China's sovereignty and maritime 
interests against intensified disruption by 
other claimants.29 China believes that the 
DoC has enabled a growing number of 
foreign oil companies to exploit SCS energy 
resources, and enabled fishing by foreign 
ships leading to growing disputes, given 
that the SCS is considered by China as its 
historical fishing ground.30 Moreover, 
China’s historical claims over the SCS are 
unlikely to be accepted in the modern 
international legal system.31 At the same 
time, ASEAN’s insistence on the 
development of a multilateral Code of 
                                                          
28 Nguyen Thi Lan Anh, ‘New ten-dashed line map 
revealed China’s ambition’, 19 July 2014, retrieved 30 
May 2015, 
<www.thanhniennews.com/commentaries/new-
tendashed-line-map-revealed-chinas-ambition-
28816.html>. 
29 J Zhang, op.cit, p. 19. 
30 Ibid, p. 21. 
31 International Crisis Group, Stirring Up the South 
China Sea (I), Asia Report No. 223, 23 April 2012, in J 
Zhang, op.cit. 
Conduct (CoC) in the SCS has deepened 
China’s anxiety. 
Second, Xi Jinping wants to define 
his leadership by reasserting China’s core 
interests and nationalism. Xi has great 
influence in the foreign policy making 
process. As argued by Huang, Xi is a very 
different leader from his predecessor, Hu 
Jintao, as ‚Xi’s style is more like a 
strongman leader‛.32 Xi is the first member 
of the Politburo,33 the elite group of the CCP 
which consists of seven people and which 
oversees China’s policy-making (primus 
inter pares). President Xi leads a number of 
committees that deal with different aspects 
of foreign and security policy and he has a 
decisive voice.34 
Third, as a result of the increasing 
global influence of China, the number of 
domestic actors involved in the foreign 
policy making process has increased. 
Besides the Politburo and party organs, 
there are also financial and business groups, 
regional and city bosses, the media 
(conventional and modern), research 
institutes, the People Liberation Army 
(PLA) and branches of the armed forces.35 
These agencies certainly influence China’s 
foreign policies. Sometimes their priorities 
and interests are not always in line with 
Beijing. For example, in 2014 when The 
Hunan Map Publishing House issued the 
ten-dashed line map mentioned above.  This 
incident is similar to the one that occurred 
in 2012 when Hainan Province, without 
                                                          
32 C Huang, ‘Change Agent or Steady as She Goes?’, 
in J Sharp, op.cit, p. 28. 
33 President Xi Jinping is a member of the Politburo 
along with Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Wang Qishan, 
Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Zhang 
Gaoli. 
34 F Cameron, op.cit. 
35 Ibid. 
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permission from Beijing, issued passports 
with the U-shaped line map that depicted 
China’s SCS claims.  
China’s recent moves have raised 
some doubts that China has become more 
assertive in South China Sea. In turn, it has 
been reasons for the US to play a greater 
role in Southeast Asia. 
 
The United States’s Interests in the South 
China Sea 
 
‚We do not have a position on the legal merits of 
the competing sovereignty claims to the islands, 
but we do have a position under the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 
potential maritime claims.‛36 
 
It has been argued that 2009 was not 
only a turning point regarding China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea 
dispute, but also a turning point regarding 
the US position in this dispute. On 23 July 
2009, Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, 
signed TAC at the Sixteenth ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF). This was the US 
‚Pivot‛, the starting point for the ‚back to 
Asia‛ policy. The Obama administration 
wished to enhance US presence in Southeast 
Asia.37 The US policy on the SCS was made 
clear one year later, when Hillary Clinton 
attended the Seventeenth ARF in Hanoi, 
Vietnam. Clinton clearly declared that the 
                                                          
36 US Department of State, ‘U.S. Department of State 
Daily Press Briefing’, 10 May 1995, retrieved 10 May 
2015, 
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefing
s/1995/9505/950510db.html>. 
37 Manyin, ME, Garcia, MJ, Morrison WM, ‘U.S. 
Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC)’, CRS Report for Congress, 5 May 
2009, retrieved 21 May 2015, 
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124064.
pdf>. 
United States has a national interest in the 
freedom of navigation in the South China 
Sea.38 
However, this was not the first time 
that the United States declared an interest in 
the SCS. On 10 May 1995, the United States 
issued a US Department of State Daily Press 
Briefing, which stated that maintaining 
freedom of navigation in the region is a 
fundamental interest of the United States. 
The United States clarified its position by 
saying that: 
‚The US takes no position on the legal 
merits of the competing claims to 
sovereignty over the various island, 
reefs, atolls, and cays in the South 
China Sea‛. The United States would, 
however, view with serious concern any 
maritime claim or restriction on 
maritime activity in the South China 
Sea that was not consistent with 
international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS.39 
The United States has consistently 
used the issue of freedom of navigation as 
its primary reason for showing interest in 
the South China Sea. Since the ‘pivot’ in 
2009, the United States consistently has 
raised this issue at annual ARF Meetings. In 
2011, at the first East Asia Summit (EAS) 
attended by US President Barack Obama, 
the US restated its previous position that it 
                                                          
38 R Emmers, ‘The US Rebalancing Strategy: Impact 
on the South China Sea’, National Security College, 
retrieved 21 May 2015,  
<http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-brief-
8.pdf>. 
 
39 US Department of State, op.cit. 
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takes no position in the dispute, but that 
freedom of navigation is its core interest.40 
However, according to Fravel, the 
US has two principal interests in the South 
China Sea. First is the freedom of 
navigation. Here the US refers to Articles 87 
of the UNCLOS, which declares that ‚The 
high seas are open to all States, whether 
coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high 
seas is exercised under the conditions laid 
down by this Convention and by other rules 
of international law. It comprises, inter alia, 
both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) 
freedom of navigation; ...‛.41 The US asserts 
it has legitimate economic and military 
interests in freedom of navigation in the 
SCS. According to Glaser, more than US 1 
trillion dollars’ worth of the US trade comes 
through the SCS every year.42 In addition, 
US naval vessels from the US West Coast 
and Japan pass through the South China Sea 
on their way to the Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf. The second principal US 
interest is peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia region. This relates to trade and 
economic development – any disruption to 
the security of sea-lanes in the SCS would 
affect cross-border trade and investment.43 
The United States has raised these 
principal interests in the SCS since it poses 
several security threats. According to 
Fravel, since the 2001 incident in which a 
                                                          
40 R Emmers, op.cit. 
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreement
s/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>. 
42 B S Glaser, ‘Armed Clashes in the South China Sea’, 
New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, p. 4, 
<http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-
sea/p27883>. 
43 M T Fravel, ‘US Policy Towards the Disputes in the 
South China Sea Since 1995’, Policy Report, March 
2014, p. 2. 
US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet 
fighter collided44, China has tried to restrict 
US military activities in this zone, especially 
regarding surveillance and reconnaissance. 
Furthermore, the modernization of the PLA  
Navy poses a challenge to US Naval vessels 
in the SCS.45 Accordingly, in light of these 
security threats in the SCS, Fravel also 
argued that the US has to maintain three 
interests: ‚its commitments to allies in the 
region, its stable and cooperative relations 
with China, and finally its neutrality 
regarding the sovereignty of land 
features‛.46 
Therefore, the US’s support to the 
Philippines can be put in the context of the 
US commitment to its ally. The Philippines, 
one of the claimant states in the South 
China Sea dispute, is a US ally based on the 
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.  Article VI 
provides the mechanism for the two 
countries to respond if there is an armed 
attack on the metropolitan territory of either 
of the Parties, or on the island territories 
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or on its 
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in 
the Pacific.47 Although there is debate about 
whether the South China Sea is a part of the 
US obligation under the treaty48, President 
                                                          
44 Incident happened when a US EP-3 reconnaissance 
plane and a China’s F-8 fighter jet collided near 
Hainan Island. 
45 M T Fravel, op.cit. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Yale Law School, ‘Mutual Defense Treaty between 
the United States and the Republic of the Philippines’, 
30 August 1951, retrieved 10 May 2015, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp
>. 
48 Some in the Philippines refer to  the 1999 diplomatic 
letter from the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, 
Thomas Hubbard, to the Philipinnes’ Foreign 
Secretary Domingo Siazon, which affirmed William 
Cohen’s statement that the South China Sea is 
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Obama seemed to make it clear on his visit 
to the Philippines in May 2014 when he 
stated that: "… our commitment to defend 
the Philippines is ironclad and the United 
States will keep that commitment, because 
allies never stand alone."49 Moreover, the US 
and the Philippines signed the Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 
2014 which updated and upgraded their 
defense commitments.50 
Since the US declared its renewed 
interest in the South East Asian region, the 
SCS dispute has been mentioned in other 
ARF and EAS participants’ statements. 
Initially China did not expect the 
international exposure of the SCS dispute, 
but since Vietnam and Indonesia chaired 
the ASEAN in 2010 and 2011 respectively, 
ongoing exposure is inevitable. However, in  
2012, when ASEAN was chaired by 
Cambodia, a close economic partner of 
China, ASEAN failed to issue a joint 
communique regarding the SCS dispute. 
This was because Cambodia refused to 
incorporate the April 2012 Scarborough 
Shoal incident into the final document of 
                                                                                       
considered as part of the Pacific area, to ensure that it 
is part of the treaty. 
 Fonbuena, C, ‘Old letter of US envoy details US 
pledge to defend West PH Sea’, 14 May 2014, 
retrieved 21 May 2015, 
<http://www.rappler.com/nation/58048-edca-hearing-
congress>. 
49 Fonbuena, C, ‘Obama: U.S. commitment to PH 
'ironclad'’, 29 April 2014, retrieved 21 May 2015, 
<http://www.rappler.com/nation/56690-obama-
ironclad-support-philippines>. 
50 US support for the Philippines is increasingly 
evident with the signing of the Improved Defense 
Treaty, the ten-year agreement that allows the US 
military greater presence  in the Philippines signed on 
28 April 2014 between the Philippine Defense 
Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, and US Ambassador to 
the Philippines, Philip Goldberg , a few hours before 
Obama's arrival in the Philippines. 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. At the ASEAN 
Summit of November 2012, ASEAN and 
China also failed to negotiate a multilateral 
Code of Conduct (CoC) for the SCS. ASEAN 
has not yet reached a consensus on a 
multilateral code as four of the six SCS 
claimants were ASEAN member states. 
Indeed China insists on negotiating 
bilaterally with ASEAN members.  
The disagreement between ASEAN 
member countries is actually unfavorable 
for regional security, and as argued by 
Emmers, has reduced the strategic benefits 
which are provided by US rebalancing 
strategy in Southeast Asia,51 something that 
is not desirable for the US from its greater 
involvement in the Southeast Asia region 
since regional peace and stability in 
Southeast Asia is one of the principal US 
interests in the SCS.  
 
Australia’s Interests in the  
South China Sea 
 
‚It shows the United States can say a lot about 
regional prosperity but doesn’t do much. China 
only says some things, but does a lot.‛52 
 
It has been argued that Australia has 
no direct interests in the South China Sea. 
But, since Australia has a security alliance 
with the United States, has close economic 
relations with China, and is a member of 
both the ARF and EAS, the South China Sea 
                                                          
51 R Emmers, op.cit, p. 43. 
52 J Perlez, ‘Asia’s ‘Big Guy’ Spreads Cash and Seeks 
Influence in Pacific Region’, 22 November 2014, 
retrieved 21 May 2015,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/asia/asia
s-big-guy-xi-jinping-spreads-cash-and-seeks-
influence-in-pacific-region.html>. 
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dispute does have an impact on Australia’s 
strategic considerations and interests 
regarding regional stability. Furthermore, 
Australia’s 2013 Defense White Paper 
clearly stated that: ‚Australia has interests 
in the peaceful resolution of territorial and 
maritime disputes including in the South 
China Sea in accordance with international 
law, the prevention of aggression within 
Southeast Asia, and freedom of navigation 
and maritime security in the region’s sea 
lanes‛.53 Therefore, a peaceful SCS is in 
Australia’s interests, particularly as 
Australia’s extensive shipping trade with 
East Asia passes through this region.54 
Australia and the United States have 
a security treaty entitled the Australia New 
Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty, 
signed on 1 September 1951. The focus of 
this treaty is the   security guarantee 
provided to Australia by the US, although 
this guarantee does not seem to be as 
explicit as the one relating to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).55 The 
ANZUS treaty involves not only security 
guarantees for Australia, but also provides 
Australia access to US intelligence and 
military technologies that it could not 
                                                          
53 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, 
retrieved 22 May 2015, 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/
WP_2013_web.pdf>. 
54 Northeast Asia is the destination of 55 percent of 
Australia’s merchandise export, based on Australian 
Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Country and Region Factsheets, in Dupont, A 
Dupont, ‘Living with the Dragon: Why Australia 
needs a China Strategy’, Lowy, Sydney 2011, 
retrieved 25 May 2015, < 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Dupont%
2C_Living_with_the_dragon_web.pdf>. 
55 P Edwards, ‘Permanent Friends? Historical 
Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance’, 
Lowy Institute Paper, No. 8, 2005, pp. 16-17. 
produce itself.56 In addition, as Kelton 
argues, the ANZUS alliance enhances the 
prospects of Australian influence in the 
region which benefits Australia’s long-term 
interests.57 However, as a consequence, the 
US almost certainly expects diplomatic and 
military support from Australia in any 
major US maritime military measures in 
East or South East Asia.58 Australia has 
previously proved its commitment to the 
alliance by joining major US military actions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The US has clearly committed itself 
to a rebalance of power in the South East 
Asian region, making commitments 
regarding the security of South East Asian 
allies involved in the South China Sea 
dispute. There are questions, however, 
about the extent to which Australia would 
support the US in an East Asian conflict.  
As mentioned, in the 2013 Defense 
White Paper, Australia strongly supports 
the continued engagement and enhanced 
presence of the United States in South East 
Asia. However, that does not necessarily 
mean that Australia would militarily 
support the US in any South China Sea 
dispute. Australia may be confronted with a 
situation similar to when President Bush 
declared China as a strategic competitor, 
but Prime Minister John Howard and 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer did not 
follow US’s China Policies.59 Australia chose 
to play its own strategy, choosing to 
actively support the US in  
                                                          
56 Department of  Defence, op.cit 
57 M Kelton, ‘More than an Ally? Contemporary 
Australia-US Relations, Ashgate, USA, 2008, p. 187.  
58 A Behm, in J Lee, op.cit, p. 404. 
59 C Tubilewicz, ‘The 2009 Defence White Paper and 
the Rudd Governmet’s Response to China’s Rise’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, 
March 2010, pp. 149-157. 
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Afghanistan and Iraq, while at the 
same time refraining from opposing China 
on issues related to China’s core strategic 
interests. Further, in 2003, Australia 
surprisingly rejected an invitation from the 
US to join in secret meetings on how to deal 
with the rise of China. UK, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Japan, which are called as the 
Halibut Group, attended the meeting. 
Concerned about offending China, 
Australia preferred to talk bilaterally with 
the US. Australia considered that it would 
gain more through individual talks with the 
US, and at the same time avoids offending 
China.60 
Australia’s pragmatic foreign 
policies have helped Australia build a 
strategic economic partnership with China. 
China is now Australia’s largest trading 
partner and second-biggest export market.61 
According to Griffiths and Wesley, 
pragmatism in Australia’s foreign policy is 
reinforced by several factors. First, as a 
status quo power with a strategic alliance 
with the US, Australia tends to avoid risks 
that could reduce its privilege. Second, 
Australia culturally has national characters 
such as ‚suspicious of big‛, abstract 
thought and keen for immediate and visible 
results. Third, bureaucratic problem in 
Australian foreign policy-making is also 
evident since only a few executives with 
excessive load involves. Finally, Griffiths 
and Wesley called this last factor as a 
‚culture of serendipity‛ that Australia 
                                                          
60 L Sales, ‘Australia declines invitation to US forum 
on China’, 28 June 2005, retrieved 22 May 2015, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1401925.ht
m>. 
61 M Griffiths & M Wesley, ‘Taking Asia Seriously’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, 
March 2010, p. 20. 
‚seems to be always saved‛ by the 
international occurrence. Therefore, as they 
quoted from Horne (1965), ‚a country that 
has never had to weather the full impact of 
an international challenge is not disposed to 
think hard about the future‛.62 
Nonetheless, relations between 
Australia and China have fluctuated since 
1972 when Australia built diplomatic 
relations with China. Significant progress in 
the relationship was made during Kevin 
Rudd’s prime leadership in 2008. China was 
his first overseas trip. However, in 2009 the 
partnership reached a low point63 when the 
2009 Defense White Paper considered China 
to be a threat. The White Paper argued that 
China's military build-up went beyond 
what it needed for a conflict with Taiwan.64 
For China, as stated in the Beijing Review, 
this White Paper was just an excuse for 
Australia to increase its military budget, 
and to assure the US that Australia would 
not further its relations with China.65 
In the 2013 Defense White Paper, 
four key Australian strategic goals are 
identified: a secure Australia, a secure South 
Pacific and Timor Leste, a stable Indo-
Pacific66, and a stable, rules-based global 
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
63 C Tubilewicz, op.cit. 
64 See point 4.26-27 in Department of  Defense, 
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 
2030, Australia, 2009, retrieved 29 May 2015, 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/CDG/Documents/defenc
e_white_paper_2009.pdf>. 
65 C Tubilewicz, op.cit. 
66 The 2013 Defence White Paper defined the  Indo-
Pacific region as a wider concept of the Asia-Pacific 
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order. The paper acknowledged that the 
security of South East Asia is central to a 
stable Indo-Pacific region. Australia has for 
some time engaged with South East Asia for 
such security reasons. 
Australia became ASEAN's very 
first Dialogue Partner in 1974 and was a 
founding member of the ARF in 1994. 
Australia’s accession to the TAC in 
December 2005 was primarily motivated by 
Canberra’s desire to be a founding member 
of the EAS.67 The ASEAN-Australia 
Dialogue Relations achieved a significant 
milestone in 2007 with the adoption of the 
Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia 
Comprehensive Partnership.68 Clearly, 
South East Asia is recognized as part of 
Australia’s strategic interests. The 2009 
Defense White Paper did mention that ‚a 
secure and stable Southeast Asia is in 
Australia’s strategic interests‛.69 Therefore, 
it is not surprising that Australia chooses to 
support ASEAN’s view regarding the 
proposal for a multilateral CoC in the SCS. 
 
The Impacts of China’s Assertiveness on 
the US and Australian Foreign Policy 
China’s growing assertiveness in the 
South China Sea has had an impact on US 
and Australian foreign policy. First of all, it 
seems to have prompted a shift in US 
policy, one toward greater involvement in 
the Southeast Asia. At the same time, the 
South East Asia countries have welcomed 
                                                          
67 Manyin, ME, Garcia, MJ, Morrison WM, op.cit. 
68 ASEAN Secretariat, ‘Overview of Australia-ASEAN 
Relations’, retrieved 22 May 2015, 
<http://www.asean.org/asean/external-
relations/australia/item/overview-of-asean-australia-
dialogue-relations>. 
69 Department of Defense, Defending Australia in the 
Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, op.cit. 
the US presence in region, especially 
Vietnam and the Philippines, both in 
dispute with China over SCS claims. 
Vietnam has increased its defence relations 
with the US by conducting joint naval 
activities and opening its commercial repair 
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay to all navies.70 
The Philippines has also enhanced 
its defense arrangements with the US. The 
signing of the EDCA, April 28, 2014, has 
enabled the US to use Philippine military 
facilities and deploy US troops on a 
rotational basis, while at the same time the 
US gives assistance to the Philippines 
Armed Forces.71 In addition, the US 
government supports the efforts of the 
Philippines in its SCS sovereignty claim at 
the Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague. 
Interestingly, in December 2014, Vietnam 
joined the Philippines by submitting a 
position paper to the arbitral tribunal.72 
Second, China’s assertiveness has 
deepened the rivalry between the US and 
China. China views the US rebalancing 
strategy, its focus on the South China Sea, 
and its strengthening of regional bilateral 
alliances as an attempt to contain China’s 
peaceful rise. For China, the US argument 
about freedom of navigation is only an 
excuse to justify greater US military 
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71‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
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America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation’, retrieved 25 
May 2015, 
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/220920869/Enhanced-
Defense-Cooperation-Agreement>. 
72 Heydarian, R J, ‘South China Sea legal battle hots 
up’, Straits Times, 18 December 2014, retrieved 25 
May 2015, 
<http://www.straitstimes.com/news/opinion/more-
opinion-stories/story/south-china-sea-legal-battle-
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presence in the region.73 A sign of deepened 
rivalry can be traced to the divided ASEAN 
response to the South China Sea issue, 
especially the failure to issue a joint 
communique at the 2012 ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting. ASEAN also faces 
difficulties in drafting a multilateral COC in 
the SCS since China insists that this be done 
bilaterally. As a result of China’s insistence, 
ASEAN cannot achieve consensus on how 
to address the SCS sovereignty dispute. 
Third, the more assertive China 
foreign policy in the South China Sea has 
caused a dilemma for Australia. Since the 
risk of conflict between the US and China is 
rising, as argued by Dupont, ‚Australia 
could be drawn into the unresolved 
territorial dispute in the South China Sea‛.74 
Although the potential for war is low, the 
deteriorating situation may in the future 
force Australia to choose between its 
security ally and its major trading partner.75 
Finally, Australia cannot avoid 
foreign policy ambiguity and pragmatism 
in regards to the increasing rivalry between 
the US and China. The ambiguity can be 
seen in the 2013 Defence White Paper which 
did not offer any clues regarding the extent 
to which Australia might play a role, even a 
minor one, in reducing strategic tensions 
between the US and China.76 This position is 
based on the desire not to disrupt key 
relationships. Australia is happy with the 
status quo. Consequently, on the one hand, 
Australia would like to maintain its alliance 
                                                          
73 R Emmers, op.cit. 
74 A Dupont, op.cit. 
75 Ibid. 
76 J Lee, ‘Australia’s 2015 Defence White Paper: 
Seeking Strategic Opportunities in Southeast Asia to 
Help Manage China’s Peaceful Rise’, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2013, pp. 395-422. 
commitment with the United States, while 
not explicitly offending China. On the other 
hand, Australia would like to support the 
ASEAN goal of a multilateral CoC in the 
SCS, thereby possibly offending China.  
This ambiguity and pragmatism, argues 
Griffiths, seems to show that Australia 
cannot have independent foreign policies.77 
The best thing Australia can do is avoiding 
collision, especially in its relations with the 
US and China, while at the same time play a 
constructive role in the development of 
some compromise between the US and 
China. In agreement with the idea of ‚A 
Concert of Asia‛, as proposed by White, 
which could engage Asia’s great powers, 
such the US, China, Japan, and India, 
Australia can play a role in this framework. 
As White argues,  this order ‚would 
maintain the greatest strategic role for 
America in Asia while also maintaining 
peaceful US-China relations... [which] also 
best preserves Australia’s alliance with 
America‛.78 
 
Conclusion 
The external dynamics of South 
China Sea dispute and domestic 
consideration of Xi Jinping’s leadership to 
define the rules of its presidency has made 
Xi’s policies seem to be more assertive. 
However, these developments have 
impacted on the US and Australian foreign 
policy. First, it seems to have prompted a 
shift in US policy toward greater 
                                                          
77 M Griffiths, ‘US-China Relations: Should Australia 
Be Worried?’, Professionals’ Lecture Series, Flinders 
University, 26 May, 2015. 
78 Hugh White, ‘Powershift: Rethinking Australia’s 
Place in the Asian Century’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2011, pp. 81-93. 
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involvement in the Southeast Asia. Second, 
it has deepened the rivalry between the US 
and China. Third, it has caused a dilemma 
for Australia between its security ally and 
its major trading partner. Finally, the 
increasing rivalry between the US and 
China leads Australia into foreign policy 
ambiguity and pragmatism.  
These impacts basically reveal that 
this dispute is not only about China and 
other claimant states. Therefore, China only 
has at least two best options: achieve the 
win-win solution multilaterally by using 
ASEAN mechanism and its economic 
leverage; or maintain the status quo without 
pushing the claim assertively. Then, the US 
and Australian foreign policy could lead 
China into this way. 
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